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This paper assesses the effects of public capital in Italy on the main macroeconomic 
aggregates: GDP, private capital and labour. A cointegrated vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model, in line with recent advancements in the field, allows us to take into account the 
complex nexus of direct and indirect links between the variables. We find a persistent 
increase in GDP in response to a positive shock to public capital; this result is mainly 
attributable to a strong stimulus exerted by public infrastructures on private capital 
(crowding in). The positive effects of public capital are quite pervasive across Italy, albeit to 
differing extents. In particular, a higher elasticity of GDP to public capital is estimated for 
the South, whereas marginal productivity turns out to be higher in the Centre-North. This 
suggests that public capital has a lower economic return in the South, bearing out the 
existence of a potential conflict between equity and efficiency goals. Finally, we indirectly 
document the existence of positive spillover effects at the regional level, allowing individual 
regions to benefit from the endowment of public capital in the rest of the country. 
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1. Introduction
1 
The issue of the contribution of public capital accumulation to economic growth comes up 
frequently in economic and political debates, the main goal being to establish if public capital is 
productive and to what extent. Increasing attention is also paid to the geographical allocation of 
expenditure, because a trade-off between equity (when government decides to invest more in 
depressed regions having the greatest need of infrastructures) and efficiency goals (when 
government decides to invest more in highly productive regions) may arise. 
In line with more recent contributions in the empirical literature, this paper adopts an approach 
based on vector autoregressive (VAR) models to assess the effects of public capital on Italy’s 
economic performance both in the country as a whole and in its main areas and regions. To 
implement the approach new regional public capital stock figures are estimated for different types 
of assets and covering a more recent period. The VAR approach was preferred to the traditional 
production function approach for its flexibility: in fact, it does not impose strong a priori 
restrictions on the dynamics of the process, allowing for both direct and indirect linkages between 
the model variables. Dynamic feedbacks are essential to better understanding the relationship 
between public capital and economic performance, since public capital may affect output either 
directly as an additional input in the production function or indirectly via its effects on private 
inputs, such as capital and labour. Accordingly, while focusing on the long run effect of government 
capital expenditure on output, this paper also provides some new evidence of whether public capital 
crowds out or crowds in private capital in Italy. 
Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on this argument. Section 3 details the capital stock 
estimation methodology and reports some descriptive statistics. Sections 4 and 5 discuss, 
respectively, the econometric model and the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The empirical literature 
In his seminal studies on the productivity of public capital in the United States, Aschauer 
(1989, a-b) adopted a single-equation static production function approach, in which public capital 
was treated as input, as well as labour and private capital. The author found a very large positive 
effect of public capital on GDP, suggesting that public investment would have paid for itself by 
                                                 
1 We greatly benefited from valuable comments by Luigi Cannari, Paola Casavola, Andrea Lamorgese, Fabio 
Quintiliani and other participants at seminars held in the Bank of Italy. The responsibility for the contents of the paper 
rests with the authors and not with the Bank of Italy.  
 
6
means of additional tax revenues. A large body of empirical literature developed after these 
contributions; yet they failed to replicate such large effects and reached mostly inconclusive results. 
This approach was heavily criticized from an econometrics viewpoint. As reported in Pereira 
(2000), since these production functions are based on non-stationary variables, OLS estimates are 
spurious in the absence of cointegration and may also suffer from simultaneity bias. So 
straightforward conclusions about causality cannot be drawn. Subsequently, some authors studied 
the more complex ways in which public capital can affect output and growth in a general 
equilibrium context (Baxter and King, 1993): directly, because investment in public capital is part 
of GDP; or indirectly, because public capital may influence other inputs, such as labour and private 
capital. The signs of these relations are a priori ambiguous: in other words, it is not obvious 
whether a greater availability of public capital reduces the need for private inputs (substitution 
effect) or increases the marginal productivity of private inputs, thereby lowering the marginal costs 
of production and potentially increasing the level of production (scale effect). At the same time, 
private inputs (labour and capital) may also influence public capital formation. For example, more 
private investment may increase taxable income, boosting in government resources and 
consequently public expenditure. 
In order to manage the whole system of feedbacks, the use of VAR models is gradually 
becoming prevalent in the empirical literature. Studies adopting this approach mostly show a 
positive long-run response of output to a shock in public capital. Reverse causation appears to exist 
in the long run, suggesting that public capital should be treated as an endogenous variable. The 
majority of contributions focused on the United States. To our knowledge, only three studies 
(Mittnik and Neumann, 2001; Pereira, 2001; Kamps, 2005) extended the analysis to a group of 
OECD countries. Among these, only Kamps (2005) included Italy, finding a positive long-run 
elasticity of public capital with respect to private capital, a negative effect on employment, and a 
positive albeit not significant effect on GDP. 
The empirical results for Italy are not straightforward, since they differ not only across 
methodologies but also within the same approach. Picci (1999) reports a positive relationship 
between public capital and output, following a production function approach as well as a cost 
function approach. Bonaglia et al. (2000) find a positive contribution of infrastructure to TFP 
growth, output and cost reduction, although the magnitude of the cost reducing effect does not 
appear large enough to outweigh the cost of the public capital,  even with huge differences across 
areas (an almost null elasticity in the North-West and an elasticity of 0.49 in the South). More  
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recently, Bronzini and Piselli (2009) adopted a production function approach, finding that there 
exists a long-run equilibrium between productivity levels and public capital and that regional 
productivity is found to be positively affected by the public infrastructure of neighbouring regions. 
Lack of data generally makes an extension of the analysis to a regional level more 
complicated. Therefore, the studies have so far been concentrated on countries with a sufficient 
body of data (the United States and, more recently, Spain). While estimates for a country as a whole 
generally suggest the existence of positive effects of public capital on output, the empirical 
evidence with regional data is indeed weaker and more ambiguous. In particular, the sum of 
regional effects is usually lower than the aggregate effect. This divergence has stimulated more 
advanced econometric methodologies. Thus, more recently, empirical models have been enriched 
by adopting spatial econometric techniques, which explicitly take into account that a specific area 
may benefit from public capital endowed either in the same area (internal capital) or in the nearest 
ones (spillovers arising from external capital; Holtz-Eakin, 1993 and Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz, 
1995).
 For Spanish regions, Pereira and Roca-Sagalés (2003) find that the contribution of public 
capital to GDP may be almost equally divided into one part internal capital and another part 
attributable to the capital endowment in the rest of the country. 
3. Public capital data 
3.1 – Capital stock estimates 
Regional public capital data are not available in Italy. In order to evaluate the effect of public 
capital on the main macroeconomic variables in Italy’s regions, they have to be estimated in line 
with the national series. As in Bonaglia and Picci (2000) and Montanaro (2003), we obtain regional 
public capital stock estimates by applying the perpetual inventory method (PI) to the regional 
investment series (millions of euros at 1995 constant prices). 
The basic idea underlying this method is that the capital stock at the end of a period can be 
expressed as a function of: i) the capital stock at the beginning of the period; and ii) the gross 
investment during the service life. This requires a sufficiently long time series of public investment, 
with some problems in harmonizing different data sources. Considering that we do not have public 
investment series by region and type of works, we proceed to estimate them, by applying the 
regional shares in Istat’s Executed Public Works (available from 1928 to 2001) to the aggregate 
national series. To preserve the continuity and homogeneity of the series for the entire period 1928-
2001, we classify the data in: i) Transport infrastructures; ii) Public and social buildings; iii) Other  
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works. Once the investment series from 1928 to 2001 has been estimated, we proceed to calculate 
the public capital stock for the years 1970-2001, substantially refreshing the data estimated by 
Montanaro (2003) and used in Bronzini and Piselli (2009).
2 To sum up, the data do not significantly 
differ from those already used in Picci (1999), La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000), Bonaglia et al. 
(2000), except when: a) they cover a more recent period; b) they are based on a longer investment 
series; and c) they avoid some reliability problems with the Executed Public Works data in the 
1970s (see Montanaro, 2003 for further details). 
If we assume that any capital good provides services that do not decline as it ages, then the 
good itself does not depreciate at a constant rate, but will be withdrawn on the basis of a distribution 
of retirements around the service life. In this case, we have the gross capital stock (see Rosa-Siesto, 
1985; Baghli et al, 2006; OECD, 1992 and 2001), measured at year i as the sum of past investment 
weighted by survival probabilities. Each investment flow is valued at as new prices regardless of the 
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where T is the maximum duration life, defined on the basis of the average duration life M and 
above assumptions as the solution of  2 / 1 * 3 / 2 + = T M  and depending on the type of 
infrastructures (i.e. 40 years for roads and highways, on the basis of OECD estimates for public 
                                                 
2 Assuming a maximum duration life T of about 40 years on average, the 1970 (monetary) stock entirely depends on 
investment made from 1928 onwards, regardless of the infrastructure endowments existing in the 1928. Even though 
past conditions may somehow have to do with present endowments – for instance, we can argue that the presence of old 
traced routes would make easier to realize a new road – after 40 years the (unknown) stock in 1928 is assumed to be 
completely withdrawn in an economic sense.  
 
9
goods). Figure A (directly taken from Baghli et al, 2006) draws the survival function on the left and 
the corresponding probability density function of age (i.e. the probability to be withdrawn) on the 
right (in this case, T is hypothetically assumed to be equal to 30 years). 
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Alternatively, if we assume that the capital stock depreciates at a constant rate, the good in 
question provides a quantity of services which declines as it ages over its life span. Assuming the 
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In this paper we select the concept of productive capital stock, which allows us to take into 
account a decreasing efficiency of surviving assets over time. As in OECD (2001), the productive 
capital (expressed in standard efficiency units) is a measure of the capital services that the different 
types of assets give to the production process. In the literature the recommended measure of capital 
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          = i s  survival rate at i of past investment 
          = i e  efficiency of an i-period old asset. 
 
We choose a hyperbolic shape for the age-efficiency profile (Figure B-left, taken from Baghli 
et al, 2006), in order to have a function decreasing over time: 
i T
i T






where we use β=0.75 (β is commonly assumed equal to 0.50 for machinery and equipment, 
not included in our analysis, and equal to 0.75 for both buildings and housing). Then the productive 
capital is the combination of both the survival of assets and the decrease in efficiency over their 
lifetime (Figure B-right, taken from Baghli et al, 2006). 
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For the private capital series, we use the regional capital stock estimates produced by Piselli 
(2001). Also in this case, the regional private stock is obtained using the PI method. We subtracted 
the government share from the private capital stock, in order to avoid considering public capital 
twice. Thus private capital does not include, for every year and region, the stock in non-housing 
buildings owned by “Other Services”, which covers government, education, health, etc. While this 
aggregate may include the stock owned by private subjects, this share is plausibly negligible. 
3.2 – Descriptive analysis 
According to our data, productive public capital accumulation – at constant prices – has been 
declining in Italy since the 1970s. After the slight recovery in the 1980s, it began to decline again in 
the period 1991 to 1995. From 1996 to 2001 the annual growth rate stabilized at around 1.5 per 
cent: it was stronger in the North (Figures 1 and 2, in the Appendix).  
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The decline in transport infrastructures capital was stark. After the strong rise in the early 
1970s, it subsequently recorded an increasingly feeble trend: in recent years, its contribution was 
low with respect to the other groups of goods. In the South, growth vanished in the recent years, 
recording negative rates in 1999 and in 2001 (Figures 1 and 2). In the country as a whole, the share 
of transport infrastructures to total public capital declined from 40.3 per cent in 1980 to 33.5 per 
cent in 2000; in the North-West, it fell to 31.7 per cent (Table 9). Nevertheless, the contribution of 
public and social buildings to public capital growth was constant during the same period (Figure 1); 
it was smaller in the South (Figure 2). 
The public capital share of total capital fluctuated at around 10 per cent, declining over time; 
in the South and in the Centre of Italy the decline was more marked (Figure 3 and Table 4). 
Differences between the areas of the country were significant: again in the year 2000, the public 
capital/GDP ratio of Southern Italy was around 45 percentage points higher than that of the North-
West (Figures 4 and 5; Table 5). As regards the ratio of total public capital to regional resident 
population, the differences were slighter, but still significant: despite the recovery of the public 
investment process in more recent years, in the year 2000 every resident in the North-Western 
regions had a “virtual” stock of public capital that was around 20 per cent lower than the national 
average (Table 7). In terms of land area, the results are substantially different. In the year 2000, the 
ratio of public capital to land area in the North-West was higher than the national average, 
especially in Liguria and Lombardy (Table 6).
3 
It is worth remembering that these findings differ from analyses based on physical data. 
Among these, Ecoter (2000) shows that northern Italian regions are much more infrastructure-
endowed than regions in the South. Golden and Picci (2005) try to interpret the differences between 
the two ways of estimating public goods (monetary versus physical data), assuming that a 
significantly higher cumulative expenditure with respect to physical endowments not only may be 
explained by naturally higher construction costs, but also hides some undue corruption and 
inefficiency costs. Probably this problem occurs when estimating public capital for Italian regions. 
If monetary expenditure exceeds effective investment by a given percentage year by year, the 
PI method may overstate the level of the public capital that is actually available in the South. At the 
                                                 
3 The right parameter to judge the public capital endowment may differ from one type of works to another. For public 
and social buildings, for example, we would rather consider public capital with respect to resident population. In fact, it 
is plausible that the decision to build a hospital or not depends more on the population density than on the land area. On 
the other hand, it’s not easy to choose which variable to consider for transport infrastructures or hydraulic works, which 
provide as many services to the residents as to the area. Nevertheless, in the literature the most important transport 
infrastructures (roads, highways, railways) mostly referred to the land area (see SVIMEZ, 2002) or to the GDP.  
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same time, assuming that inefficiency gaps account for a roughly constant proportion of public 
capital expenditure in each period, they do not broadly affect the dynamics of public capital and the 
elasticity estimates obtained by implementing the VAR approach (see following sections). 
4. The model specification 
Based on the empirical literature (Pereira, 2000; Pereira and Roca-Sagalés, 2003; Kamps, 
2005), we estimate a structural VAR model with four endogenous variables: GDP, private capital 
stock (K
P), public capital stock (K
G) and employment (L, in terms of standard units).
4 All the 
variables (in logs) are expressed at constant 1995 prices and cover the years 1970 to 2002; the 
labour input is adjusted for local human capital endowment, measured by average schooling years 
of the local population. The variables considered are either estimates consistent with National 
Accounts (GDP and L) or derived from them (K
P and K
G). The series are clearly non-stationary in 
levels, the positive trend in L being due to human capital accumulation rather than increases in the 
number of hours worked. 
Before proceeding to the estimates, we briefly report the important issues of cointegration and 
identification of the innovations in the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs), already addressed by 
Pereira (2000) and Kamps (2005). Phillips (1998) shows that impulse responses and forecast error 
variance decompositions based on the estimation of unrestricted structural VAR models are 
inconsistent over long horizons in the presence of non-stationary variables. At the same time, vector 
error correction models (VECMs) yield consistent estimates of impulse responses and of forecast 
error variance decompositions if and only if the number of cointegration relations is consistently 
estimated. So we have to investigate the cointegration properties of the VAR system. 
The starting point of the cointegration analysis (Kamps, 2005) is that any VAR(p) model in 
levels 
t t p t p t t t D X A X A X A X ε + Φ + + + + = − − − ... 2 2 1 1      (1) 
can always be written in equivalent VECM form: 
t t p t p t t t t D X X X X X ε + Φ + ∆ Γ + + ∆ Γ + ∆ Γ + Π = ∆ + − − − − − 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 ...   (2) 
                                                 
4 Source: Prometeia regional estimates of GDP and our computations based on Prometeia regional employment 
estimates and Istat’s Census data on education.  
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Since individual series were all initially found to be integrated of order 1, the determination of 
the cointegration rank was subsequently based on the indications provided by the Johansen trace-
test. Following Lütkepohl (2001), the sequence starts with the null hypothesis that the cointegration 
rank is zero.
5 If this hypothesis cannot be rejected, then the testing sequence terminates and a VAR 
model in first differences is selected. At the other extreme, if all null hypotheses have to be rejected, 
then the variables can be regarded as (trend-) stationary in levels. 
Table 11 displays the results for Italy and for each of the 18 regions considered in this paper.
6 
Evidence of cointegration is found in all cases, the number of cointegrating relations at 5 per cent of 
significance ranging from 1 to 3. On the basis of this evidence, the choice of a VAR model in first 
differences, as adopted by Pereira (2000) for the United States and Pereira and Roca-Sagalés (2003) 
for Spain, appears to be unsupported by our data set. We thus estimate a VECM model for Italy and 
its geographical areas, including an intercept and linear trend in the deterministic component (both 
restricted to lie in the cointegration space). This choice implies the existence of a (log) linear trend 
in the data, a feature consistent with the dynamics of the series at a graphical inspection. 
While usual information criteria led us to deem as optimal a lag order of 4 or 5, the lag order 
of the VECM model was set equal to 2 for all the models (corresponding to a 3
rd order VAR in 
levels), and a subsequent analysis of residual cross-correlations confirmed the overall acceptability 
of this choice. The order of the model was selected by comparing both goodness of fit, mainly 
assessed by inspecting individual residual auto and cross-correlograms, and parsimony, considering 
that high order models would have rapidly exhausted the scarce degrees of freedom deriving from 
the relatively small time span of the series, thus implying less precise estimates of dynamic 
multipliers, due to the well know overparametrization problem of VAR models. Nonetheless, to 
check for robustness of our main findings, VECMs up to order 4 were fitted to the data. The results, 
available from the authors upon request, show that the pattern of structural long run responses to K
G 
shocks remain qualitatively unaffected across the different specifications. 
                                                 
5 As well explained by Kamps (2005), whose methodology we follow closely, we can distinguish three cases. (i) If the 
cointegration rank r = 0, then rank (Π) = 0 and the variables collected in Xt  are not cointegrated. So there are k 
independent stochastic trends in the system and it is appropriate to estimate the VAR model in first differences, 
dropping Xt-1  as regressor in Eq. 2. (ii) At the other extreme, if r = k, then rank (Π) = k and each variable in Xt taken 
individually must be stationary. In other words, the number of stochastic trends, given by (k – r), is equal to zero and it 
is possible to apply OLS either to the unrestricted VAR in levels (Eq. 1) or to its equivalent representation given by (2). 
(iii) In the intermediate case (0 < r < k), the variables in Xt  are driven by 0 < k - r < k common stochastic trends and 
rank (Π) = r < k. In this case, a VECM imposing the appropriate rank restriction should be the right model to estimate. 
The maximum likelihood approach developed by Johansen (1988, 1991) can be applied in order to estimate the space 
spanned by the cointegrating vectors. 
6 Because of problems in the continuity of the series, we have aggregated data for Piedmont-Valle d’Aosta and 
Abruzzo-Molise. Also, the regions considered here are 18 rather than 20 as in the NUTS II grouping.  
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5. The results 
5.1 – Impulse-response analysis and the effects of  public capital 
Having made assumptions on the cointegrating rank, we give a structural interpretation of the 
VAR model, i.e., we derive IRFs from the reduced-form parameter estimates. This is equivalent to 
estimating the reaction of key macroeconomic variables to an unexpected change (innovation) in 
one variable (e.g. public capital). 
The analysis can be based on the unrestricted VAR model in levels given by Equation (1). 
This model can serve in the structural analysis irrespective of whether the variables in X t  are 
stationary or not. The impulse-response analysis can simply proceed on the basis of the VAR(p) 
model in the representation (1), once we have put the parameters Π and Γj from the VECM (2) into 
the Ai matrices. 
Pre-multiplying Equation (1) by the (k × k) matrix A0, we obtain the structural form 






1 0 ...    (3) 
where  i i A A A 0
* ≡ for i = 1,…, p, and  t t A Be ε 0 =  describes the relation between the structural 
disturbances et (white noise and uncorrelated with each other, i.e., the variance-covariance matrix of 
the structural disturbances Σ is diagonal) and the reduced-form disturbances εt. The lower triangular 
matrix A0 describes the contemporaneous relations among all the variables in the vector Xt . 
To be meaningful in an economic sense and to analyze the dynamic causal linkages across the 
variables, the model must rely on orthogonal stochastic shocks. In other words, we have to identify 
the shocks to public capital that are not contemporaneously correlated with shocks to other 
variables, i.e., not subject to the reverse causation problem. As explained by Pereira (2000), this 
would result from knowing which part of public investment in each period is due to purely non-
economic reasons. Let’s imagine a policy function that relates public investment to the past but not 
current values of the other variables (private capital, GDP and labour). Being obviously 
uncorrelated with other innovations, the residuals from this policy function necessarily reflect the 
unexpected component in the evolution of public investment. In the context of the standard 
Choleski decomposition, this is equivalent to assuming that innovations in public investment lead to 
innovations in the other variables contemporaneously, but not vice versa.  
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Consequently, following a common procedure, we orthogonalize the VECM residuals using 
the inverse of the Choleski root of the variance-covariance matrix (standard Choleski 
decomposition). This is equivalent to assuming a recursive system of simultaneous causalities, in 
which it is necessary to have variables properly ordered by descending degree of exogeneity (Sims, 
1980). We have a maximum degree of exogeneity when there are no responses of a variable to 
current shocks to the other variables. 
In our case, public capital is reasonably assumed to represent the most exogenous variable. 
Then we have private capital, labour input and GDP, in descending order: X ≡ [K
G, K
P, L, GDP]. 
As suggested by Pereira (2000), it seems plausible that the private sector reacts rapidly to 
innovations in public investment decisions, while the reverse is not true, due to the time lags 
involved in information gathering and public decision-making. So in order to give the impulse 
response functions a structural interpretation, we identify the VAR models by assuming that the 
relation between the reduced-form disturbances εt and the structural disturbances et, i.e.  t t A Be ε 0 = , 





















































































1 43 42 41
0 1 32 31
0 0 1 21
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
   (4) 
In the equation (4), where we have six unknown parameters in the lower triangular matrix A0 
and four unknown parameters in the diagonal covariance matrix Σ of the structural disturbances εt, 
investment in public capital (K
G) is assumed not to react immediately to unexpected shocks to all 
the other macroeconomic variables. Private investment (K
P) is assumed to be predetermined with 
respect to the current unexpected fluctuations in employment and GDP, but it is potentially affected 
by contemporaneous shocks to public capital. The labour input (L) too is assumed to be 




                                                 
7 As remarked by Hansen and Sargent (1980), Blanchard and Quah (1989), Lippi and Reichlin (1993, 1994), Christiano 
et al (2006) and Alessi et al. (2008), there may be an identification problem, when the structural shocks are 
nonfundamental, i.e. N<q, where N is the dimension of the covariance stationary zero-mean vector stochastic process xt 
of observable variables and q is the dimension of the unobservable vector process ut of structural shocks, which drives 
the stochastic process xt, so that xt = C(L)ut. In other words, we have nonfundamental representations of a VAR when 
agents are able to use additional information to form expectations of future variables, thus anticipating the effects of any 
foreseen future intervention by the government (N<q). Since VAR representations are fundamental by construction, the 
nonfundamental structural shocks cannot be identified by estimating and inverting a VAR. We are conscious that a 
problem of nonfundamentalness may lie in our model as well as in every VAR model, and that fiscal policy is clearly a 
field in which, in general, structural models can produce nonfundamental representations since agents have rational  
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Figure 6 shows the impulse-response functions for the estimated model at the national level, 
and the corresponding 90 percent bootstrap confidence intervals. For Italy as a whole, a rise in the 
stock of public capital has positive and significant effects on GDP in the long run, which is 
qualitatively in line with Kamps’ estimates. 
Based on Pereira (2000), Pereira and Roca-Sagalés (2003), Kamps (2005) and Pina and St. 
Aubyn (2006), estimates of long-term elasticity of output to public capital (ηG) can be derived from 
the IRFs by dividing the long-term response (i.e. the response observed at a time horizon 
sufficiently long for IRFs to converge) of real GDP to a shock to public capital by the long-run 







= η        (5) 
where ∆ denotes a long-term response. The elasticity represents the total percentage-point change in 
the private-sector variables for each long-term percentage-point change in public investment. 
In terms of long-term elasticity, the aggregate GDP is estimated to increase by 0.62 per one-
percent increase in public capital (Table 12). The effect on private capital is also positive and 
accumulating over time, with a long-term elasticity of 0.54: so there is no evidence of crowding out 
effects, even in the short term, but rather significant crowding in effects (Table 13). Our estimates 
are rather precise, as witnessed by the 90 percent confidence intervals. 
Based on the above defined elasticity value, a long-run measure of the marginal productivity 
of public capital (MPG) can be derived by multiplying (5) by the GDP to public capital ratio 
observed over the sample period (see the second column of Table 12):  







≡        (6) 
Following this approach, our long-run marginal productivity estimate is 1.39 euros of GDP for 
each euro invested in public capital, corresponding to an annual rate of return of 1.6 per cent in a 
twenty-year horizon. In a nutshell, infrastructures appear to be a productive investment. 
Comparing these results with previous evidence in the literature is not easy, due to the 
adoption of a range of different econometric concepts and techniques, sometimes referring to 
different notions of elasticity or marginal productivity. As a matter of fact, it must be noted that 
                                                 
expectations. As a consequence, an unexpected intervention in public capital by the government might not necessarily 
coincide with the fundamental shock identified in a VAR. Nevertheless, even though extremely interesting, this 
argument is not a goal of this paper.  
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using a very similar VAR model, Pereira and Roca-Sagalés (2003) estimate, on national aggregate 
data for Spain, a long-run elasticity of output to public capital of a comparable amount (0.53); 
adopting the same approach, Pereira (2000) finds out a positive effect of public investment (i.e. 
flow instead of stock data) also for the United States. For Italy as a whole and using different data, 
Kamps (2005) obtains a very large long-run effect of public capital on output. 
Our VAR-based long-run elasticities display a greater magnitude when compared to values 
typically obtained in previous analyses implementing different econometric methods, even when 
based on Italian regional data. It is worth noting that empirical results for Italy are not easy to 
interpret, since they differ not only across methodologies (i.e. production or cost function, growth 
accounting), but also within the same approach (i.e. when estimating effects of public capital on 
output instead of productivity or TFP). For example, focusing on studies based on regional data 
similar to ours only, Picci (1999) reports an elasticity of 0.43 and 0.35 with fixed and random 
effects, respectively. When performing robustness checks, however, he finds weaker results. 
Bonaglia et al. (2000) find that public capital has no significant effects on productivity for the total 
Italian economy, albeit with huge differences across areas, with no effects in the North-West and an 
elasticity of 0.49 in the South. With a similar production function approach, La Ferrara and 
Marcellino (2000) even report a slightly negative impact of public capital. Using similar data, De 
Stefanis and Sena (2005) suggest instead that public capital has a significant impact on the 
evolution of total factor productivity, particularly in the Southern regions. Finally, Bronzini and 
Piselli (2009) find a long-run elasticity of 0.19 when calculated with respect to output. 
That said, the greater magnitude obtained here does not depend on a different data set, since 
all the cited works use public capital based on Istat’s Executed Public Works data. Instead, we are 
able to say that the difference is due to the diverse estimation methods employed. In particular, our 
VAR model accounts for both direct and indirect effects, i.e. captures the whole set of dynamic 
feedbacks among the variables in the system, whereas in a production function elasticities and 
marginal products are obtained by  maintaining the private inputs unchanged and excluding 
feedback effects. Moreover, aggregate VAR models’ estimates also capture spatial spillovers, while 
regional models on panel data estimate direct average effects of the public capital endowment 
within each region. This argument is similar to that of Munnell (1990), who found an elasticity of 
0.35 when using data for the United States as a whole, but a lower value (around 0.15) when using 
state level data. In other words, we cannot interpret panel average estimates as aggregate estimates 
for Italy as a whole, since they miss indirect and spillover effects.  
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In order to disentangle the effects of transport infrastructures from those of other public 
works, we replicate separately our estimates for these two kinds of public capital. The results show 
that the estimated elasticity is even higher for transport infrastructures; at the same time, their 
marginal productivity, in line with a stricter link to economic activities, is three times higher   
compared with other kinds of public capital (4.2 against 1.4 per cent; Table 15), with a yearly rate 
of return of 7.5 per cent. 
5.2 – The results for the Centre-North and the South 
We are able to replicate the estimates for both the Centre-North and the South of Italy. Since 
the incidence of public capital on GDP is significantly higher in the less developed South, it is very 
interesting to verify how the results vary under different economic conditions, i.e., how different 
GDP / K
G ratios affect the results in terms of long-term elasticities and marginal returns. In 
accordance with the goal of the paper, the results are only shown for the effects of unforeseen 
shocks to public capital. Table 12 displays the long-run elasticity and the marginal productivity of 
public capital; Tables 13 and 14 show the results for private capital and employment. 
The long-run responses of GDP to an innovation in public capital and the relative long-term 
elasticities (Equation 5) are positive in both areas and larger in the South (see the first column of 
Table 12) while, on the contrary, the marginal productivity of public capital (Equation 6) is higher 
in the Centre-North. As we have seen before, the difference between elasticity and marginal 
productivity depends on the role played by the GDP / K
G ratio. Let us suppose that we spend the 
same amount of euro (one euro more) in public capital both in the Centre-North and in the South. In 
the long run (defined as the time horizon over which the growth effects of innovations disappear, 
i.e., the accumulated impulse-response functions converge), the yield in terms of GDP is 1.11 euros 
in the former case and 0.84 in the latter, thus denoting a larger return from the investment in the 
Centre-North. To reconcile these results with the evidence of a higher elasticity in the South, we 
have to keep in mind that the incidence of public capital to GDP is much higher in the South (Table 
5). This implies that, with the support of the theoretical Figure C and given the Equation (6), “CN” 
standing for the Centre-North and “MEZ” for the South and Islands, although  MEZ CN η η <  , the 
ratio
G
CN CN K GDP /  is so much higher than 
G




























≡ η η    (7)  
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i.e., being the slope of the curve AA (Centre-North) in the Figure C higher than that of the curve BB 
(South and Islands), the MPG in the Centre-North is bigger than in the South. 












From a policy perspective, our results suggest the possible existence of a conflict between 
equity (when government aims to sustain depressed areas such as the South) and efficiency goals 
(when public investment aims to sustain yet highly productive regions). However, it is worth 
remembering that the public capital series utilized here relies on (properly discounted) accumulated 
monetary expenditure and that, as a result, our model yields an estimate of the effect of monetary 
expenditure on output. To some extent, the lower return to public capital expenditure in the South 
may be caused by a less efficient transformation of monetary expenditure in “effective” public 
capital, due to higher costs of producing a unit of public capital and/or a lower efficiency in 
managing public expenditure and/or a higher level of corruption in completing public 
infrastructures. Under this hypothesis, with a higher efficiency in the South, the GDP / K
G ratio 
would probably result higher in the long run. 
5.3 – The results for the regions 
We are able to produce VAR estimates at regional level too. By adopting a specification in 
line with that used at the national level, we are able to assess the degree of spatial heterogeneity in 
long-term of output to public capital and gather some indirect evidence on the possible range of 
spatial externalities across the areas. For each of the 18 regions, positive estimates of the long term 
elasticity of GDP to K
G are obtained (see the first column of Table 12). Turning to marginal  
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productivity, the impact of public capital appears to be stronger in the northern regions. In 
particular, the estimated coefficient is very high for Veneto and Piedmont.  
Multiplying each regional marginal product by the share of public capital allocated in that 
region, we obtain an estimate of the individual regional contributions to the national marginal 
product (see the third column of Table 12); if the sum of the regional contributions is significantly 
lower than the aggregate marginal product for Italy as a whole, this provides evidence that the entire 
national effect of public capital expenditure cannot be fully captured by strictly regional estimates. 
On the basis of our results, the sum of the regional contributions accounts for 0.77 of the total effect 
of public capital on GDP identified at the aggregate level (Table 12). As suggested by Pereira and 
Roca-Sagalés (2003), we can interpret these results as follows: the regional models are not able to 
capture the effect of public capital on output in its entirety because of important spillover effects 
from the public capital endowment in other regions. Allowing explicitly for spillover effects in their 
regional models, Pereira and Roca-Sagalés (2003) find that over one half of the aggregate effects 
obtained for Spain as a whole is due to innovations in public capital allocated to other regions.  
Although this comparison requires some caution, since the sum of the regional contributions 
accounts for 0.77 of the aggregate marginal productivity, while it is 0.44 in Pereira and Roca-
Sagalés (2003) for Spain, we can argue that there are less spillover effects in Italy than in Spain. 
This conclusion, that is shown to apply to private capital and labour responses as well (Tables 14 
and 15), could be tied to the circumstance that, with respect to Spain, a larger share of public 
investment in Italy has been devoted to works of smaller scale, instead of large-scale infrastructures 
whose benefits are more widespread nationwide. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Based on our estimates, the growth rate of the public capital stock in Italy has been declining 
since the 1970s. After a slight recovery in the 1980s, it dropped again at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The share of transport infrastructures to total public capital also fell over time. At the regional level, 
while public capital endowment per unit of GDP appears to be larger in the South, in more recent 
years the public capital growth rate has been higher in northern Italy.  
According to our cointegrated VAR estimates, in the short run public capital is found to exert 
a positive impact on output and employment, as predicted by Keynesian models focusing on the 
counter-cyclical role of public investment spending as an instrument to sustain private sector  
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employment. Non-Keynesian long-run positive effects of public capital on both private capital 
accumulation and GDP level are also found. Our analysis, in line with similar studies on other 
countries, accordingly provides evidence that investment in public capital is a powerful instrument 
to stimulate economic growth in the long run, a result to which a strong and sustained positive 
response of private capital clearly contributes; in other words, public and private capital appear to 
be complementary (crowding in). The larger long-run elasticities compared to other studies on 
Italian data do not depend on a different data set used, but are due to a different estimation method. 
In particular, our VAR based estimates capture the whole set of dynamic feedbacks among the 
variables in the system, whereas in a production function elasticities and marginal products are 
obtained by maintaining the private inputs unchanged and excluding feedback effects. Moreover, 
VAR models’ aggregate estimates also capture spatial spillovers, while regional models on panel 
data estimate direct average effects of the public capital endowment within the regions. 
When extended to the two main areas of the country, the analysis yields different results in 
terms of elasticity (higher in the South) and marginal productivity (higher in the Centre-North).  
Given the high elasticity estimates, the lower economic return to public capital expenditure in the 
South compared with the Centre-North could be at least partly related to lower efficiency of public 
sector expenditure in the South, implying that in this region a larger amount of resources has to be 
spent to yield a unit of effective capital. Under this hypothesis, raising public sector efficiency 
could provide a means to foster the productivity of public capital in the South. 
At the regional level, our estimates indirectly document the plausible existence of spillover 
effects, allowing each region to benefit from public capital allocated in the rest of the country. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the spatial externalities is found to be less relevant in comparison 
with the findings of similar studies on Spanish regional data, giving prominence to the issue of what 
is the most appropriate sectoral and spatial allocation of public works in order to maximize spillover 




Tables and figures 
Table 1 
GROSS PUBLIC CAPITAL 
(percentages) 
REGIONS  1980 1990 2000 
      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  5.4     6.1     6.9    
Lombardy  9.8     10.5     11.3    
Trentino-Alto Adige  2.5     2.8     3.4    
Veneto  6.1     6.1     6.4    
Friuli Venezia Giulia  2.7     3.1     3.0    
Liguria  4.0     3.7     3.6    
Emilia-Romagna  7.4     7.2     7.4    
Tuscany  6.7     6.5     6.3    
Umbria  1.9     1.8     1.6    
Marche  2.9     2.7     2.6    
Lazio  8.9     8.8     9.1    
Abruzzo and Molise  4.5     4.2     3.9    
Campania  7.7     7.9     7.7    
Puglia  4.8     4.8     4.8    
Basilicata  3.2     3.0     2.8    
Calabria  6.6     6.1     5.5    
Sicily  10.2     9.9     9.2    
Sardinia  4.7     4.6     4.6    
North West  19.2     20.3     21.7    
North East  18.6     19.3     20.2    
Centre  20.5     19.8     19.6    
South and Islands  41.6     40.6     38.5    
Italy  100.0     100.0     100.0    
  




PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC CAPITAL 
(percentages) 
REGIONS  1980 1990 2000 
      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  5.5     6.2     7.0    
Lombardy  9.9     10.7     11.5    
Trentino-Alto Adige  2.5     2.9     3.5    
Veneto  6.0     6.1     6.5    
Friuli Venezia Giulia  2.7     3.2     3.1    
Liguria  4.0     3.6     3.5    
Emilia-Romagna  7.3     7.1     7.4    
Tuscany  6.7     6.5     6.2    
Umbria  2.0     1.8     1.6    
Marche  2.9     2.7     2.6    
Lazio  8.9     8.8     9.1    
Abruzzo and Molise  4.5     4.2     3.9    
Campania  7.7     7.9     7.6    
Puglia  4.8     4.8     4.8    
Basilicata  3.2     3.0     2.8    
Calabria  6.6     6.1     5.3    
Sicily  10.2     9.8     9.1    
Sardinia  4.7     4.6     4.5    
North West  19.4     20.5     22.0    
North East  18.5     19.3     20.4    
Centre  20.5     19.7     19.5    
South and Islands  41.6     40.5     38.1    
Italy  100.0     100.0     100.0    
  




NET PUBLIC CAPITAL 
(percentages) 
REGIONS  1980 1990 2000 
      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  5.5     6.4     7.3    
Lombardy  10.2     10.9     11.7    
Trentino-Alto Adige  2.6     3.0     3.6    
Veneto  5.9     6.1     6.6    
Friuli Venezia Giulia  2.8     3.3     3.1    
Liguria  3.9     3.5     3.4    
Emilia-Romagna  7.2     7.1     7.5    
Tuscany  6.6     6.4     6.1    
Umbria  2.0     1.7     1.5    
Marche  3.0     2.6     2.5    
Lazio  8.9     8.8     9.2    
Abruzzo and Molise  4.5     4.1     3.7    
Campania  7.6     7.9     7.6    
Puglia  4.8     4.9     4.8    
Basilicata  3.2     2.9     2.7    
Calabria  6.6     5.9     5.1    
Sicily  10.2     9.8     8.9    
Sardinia  4.7     4.6     4.5    
North West  19.6     20.8     22.5    
North East  18.4     19.4     20.8    
Centre  20.4     19.6     19.4    
South and Islands  41.6     40.2     37.3    
Italy  100.0     100.0     100.0    
  





PUBLIC CAPITAL: SHARE OF TOTAL CAPITAL 
(percentages) 
REGIONS  1980 1990 2000 
      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  7.8     8.2     8.1    
Lombardy  7.4     7.4     6.9    
Trentino-Alto Adige  11.1     11.9     11.9    
Veneto  8.6     8.3     7.5    
Friuli Venezia Giulia  13.0     13.8     12.2    
Liguria  19.1     16.8     14.5    
Emilia-Romagna  10.9     10.1     9.2    
Tuscany  14.2     13.1     11.1    
Umbria  15.5     13.7     11.3    
Marche  13.8     12.2     10.6    
Lazio  13.0     12.0     10.7    
Abruzzo and Molise  17.4     15.6     13.5    
Campania  10.6     10.0     9.2    
Puglia  11.1     10.5     9.6    
Basilicata  25.7     23.3     20.9    
Calabria  22.5     20.0     16.7    
Sicily  14.6     13.3     11.7    
Sardinia  16.5     15.5     13.9    
North West  8.6     8.5     7.9    
North East  10.3     10.1     9.2    
Centre  13.7     12.5     10.9    
South and Islands  14.8     13.5     12.0    
Italy  12.0     11.2     10.1    
  




THE RATIO OF PUBLIC CAPITAL TO REGIONAL GDP 
(percentages) 
REGIONS  1980 1990 2000 
      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  27.3     33.5     37.4    
Lombardy  24.5     25.6     26.7    
Trentino-Alto Adige  56.4     66.5     75.2    
Veneto  35.3     35.6     33.3    
Friuli Venezia Giulia  57.8     69.2     62.4    
Liguria  53.9     57.1     57.0    
Emilia-Romagna  40.6     43.2     40.6    
Tuscany  47.4     49.6     44.6    
Umbria  64.8     64.5     55.4    
Marche  56.8     56.7     48.1    
Lazio  45.4     43.9     44.8    
Abruzzo and Molise  92.9     88.0     80.0    
Campania  55.1     59.6     58.0    
Puglia  48.3     50.9     49.2    
Basilicata  209.9     217.2     176.7    
Calabria  149.1     142.4     120.4    
Sicily  75.3     78.6     76.3    
Sardinia  98.4     106.9     102.7    
North West  28.6     30.8     32.5    
North East  41.9     45.2     43.2    
Centre  48.9     48.6     45.9    
South and Islands  78.7     80.9     76.1    
Italy  48.4     50.1     48.3    
  




PUBLIC CAPITAL PER SQUARE KILOMETRE 
(millions of euros) 
REGIONS  1980 1990 2000 
      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  0.63     0.93     1.18    
Lombardy  1.38     1.92     2.31    
Trentino-Alto Adige  0.62     0.90     1.22    
Veneto  1.10     1.45     1.71    
Friuli Venezia Giulia  1.15     1.73     1.89    
Liguria  2.48     2.95     3.23    
Emilia-Romagna  1.11     1.41     1.64    
Tuscany  0.98     1.23     1.34    
Umbria  0.77     0.90     0.94    
Marche  1.02     1.21     1.31    
Lazio  1.73     2.23     2.60    
Abruzzo and Molise  0.99     1.20     1.26    
Campania  1.89     2.54     2.76    
Puglia  0.83     1.09     1.22    
Basilicata  1.07     1.30     1.37    
Calabria  1.48     1.76     1.78    
Sicily  1.33     1.67     1.76    
Sardinia  0.65     0.84     0.93    
North West  1.11     1.52     1.83    
North East  1.01     1.35     1.60    
Centre  1.18     1.47     1.65    
South and Islands  1.13     1.43     1.53    
Italy  1.11     1.44     1.63    
  
 Source: based on Istat data.  
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 Table 7 
PUBLIC CAPITAL PER CAPITA 
(thousands of euros) 
REGIONS  1980 1990 2000 
      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  4.0     6.0     7.8    
Lombardy  3.7     5.2     6.1    
Trentino-Alto Adige  9.6     13.9     17.7    
Veneto  4.7     6.1     7.0    
Friuli Venezia Giulia  7.3     11.3     12.6    
Liguria  7.4     9.4     11.1    
Emilia-Romagna  6.2     8.0     9.2    
Tuscany  6.3     8.0     8.8    
Umbria  8.0     9.4     9.7    
Marche  7.0     8.2     8.7    
Lazio  6.0     7.5     8.8    
Abruzzo and Molise  9.7     11.6     12.1    
Campania  4.7     6.2     6.6    
Puglia  4.2     5.2     5.9    
Basilicata  17.4     21.2     22.9    
Calabria  10.8     12.8     13.3    
Sicily  6.9     8.6     9.1    
Sardinia  9.9     12.3     13.7    
North West  4.2     5.9     7.1    
North East  6.0     8.1     9.4    
Centre  6.4     7.9     8.8    
South and Islands  7.0     8.6     9.2    
Italy  5.9     7.7     8.6    
  




PUBLIC CAPITAL PER  STANDARD LABOUR UNIT  
(thousands of euros) 
REGIONS  1980 1990 2000 
      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  7.6     9.7     10.9    
Lombardy  7.1     7.7     8.2    
Trentino-Alto Adige  17.1     18.8     22.2    
Veneto  9.3     9.2     9.1    
Friuli Venezia Giulia  14.5     18.5     17.8    
Liguria  15.8     16.6     17.3    
Emilia-Romagna  11.1     11.1     11.1    
Tuscany  12.4     12.6     11.7    
Umbria  15.6     14.8     13.0    
Marche  12.4     12.1     11.4    
Lazio  13.6     12.8     12.9    
Abruzzo and Molise  20.9     19.8     18.5    
Campania  11.8     13.3     13.0    
Puglia  10.0     10.6     10.6    
Basilicata  39.4     41.5     37.8    
Calabria  29.2     27.5     24.6    
Sicily  18.5     19.1     18.1    
Sardinia  24.9     23.1     23.2    
North West  8.2     9.1     9.9    
North East  11.3     11.8     11.9    
Centre  13.1     12.8     12.3    
South and Islands  17.4     17.8     17.0    
Italy  12.6     13.0     12.9    
  




TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURES :  
SHARE OF TOTAL PUBLIC CAPITAL 
(percentages) 
REGIONS  1980 1990 2000 
      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  39.8     36.0     32.8    
Lombardy  32.1     29.6     26.5    
Trentino-Alto Adige  43.2     37.3     30.1    
Veneto  33.8     30.6     26.8    
Friuli Venezia Giulia  32.4     34.8     33.6    
Liguria  60.8     54.5     46.2    
Emilia-Romagna  39.9     36.8     34.0    
Tuscany  47.1     43.3     39.5    
Umbria  59.8     56.1     48.9    
Marche  49.0     46.6     40.3    
Lazio  36.5     33.1     34.6    
Abruzzo and Molise  46.6     45.0     40.7    
Campania  36.4     32.4     30.7    
Puglia  35.3     33.1     29.1    
Basilicata  35.8     34.6     31.4    
Calabria  42.6     41.1     37.2    
Sicily  45.7     41.8     38.2    
Sardinia  30.4     27.0     24.1    
North West  40.2     36.1     31.7    
North East  37.3     34.6     31.0    
Centre  44.0     40.3     38.1    
South and Islands  39.9     36.9     33.5    
Italy 40.3  37.0  33.5 
  







PUBLIC CAPITAL GROWTH BY TYPE OF WORKS 
(changes and percentage points) 
1981-1990 1991-2000 
























Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  12.9     11.8     21.8     46.6     5.4     7.7     13.4     26.5    
Lombardy  9.1    9.6    20.3    39.1     2.3    7.9    10.4    20.6   
Trentino-Alto Adige  11.2    12.8    22.1    46.2     3.3    14.2    17.4    34.8   
Veneto  6.3    8.7    16.3    31.3     1.0    6.8    10.1    18.0   
Friuli Venezia Giulia 19.6    10.8    19.2    49.6     2.0    3.1    4.4    9.5   
Liguria  4.2    6.8    8.2    19.2     -4.0    4.0    9.3    9.3   
Emilia-Romagna  6.7    7.9    11.9    26.5     2.9    7.3    6.4    16.6   
Tuscany  6.9    6.1    11.8    24.8     -0.3    4.1    5.1    8.8   
Umbria  6.5    3.7    7.9    18.1     -5.1    2.8    6.6    4.3   
Marche  6.4    4.7    7.7    18.9     -2.9    5.6    5.9    8.5   
Lazio 6.0    3.7    18.9    28.6     7.3    3.3    6.0    16.5   
Abruzzo and Molise  8.1    3.0    10.7    21.8     -2.2    3.1    4.1    5.0   
Campania  7.0    4.0    23.0    34.0     1.0    4.4    3.3    8.7   
Puglia 8.1    5.7    17.2    30.9     -0.3    3.4    9.4    12.5   
Basilicata  6.2    2.1    13.2    21.5     -1.4    3.9    3.3    5.8   
Calabria  6.4    1.1    11.8    19.3     -3.5    2.6    1.8    1.0   
Sicily 6.8    2.5    16.3    25.6     -1.4    3.1    3.8    5.5   
Sardinia  4.2    3.8    20.3    28.3     -0.3    2.9    8.3    10.9   
North West  9.2     9.6     18.2     37.1     2.1     7.1     11.1     20.3    
North East  9.0    9.3    15.8    34.1     2.2    7.5    8.9    18.6   
Centre  6.4    4.6    13.9    25.0     2.3    3.8    5.7    11.8   
South and Islands  6.7    3.1    16.5    26.4     -1.1    3.4    4.6    6.9   
Italy  8.5     6.8     17.1     30.5     5.3     9.5     11.4     17.3    












       
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  91.71  50.47  22.93  7.68  2 
Lombardy  118.88 66.86 23.69  9.73  2 
Trentino-Alto  Adige  76.08 40.71 21.35  5.71  1 
Veneto  94.21 51.33 29.39 11.76  3 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  85.13  46.21  17.61  6.20  2 
Liguria  67.01 34.91 14.62  3.69  1 
Emilia-Romagna  84.67 54.67 29.72 11.53  3 
Tuscany  119.81 62.56 30.96  4.28  3 
Umbria  89.36 49.75 27.77  6.44  3 
Marche  102.81 50.94 24.06 11.58  2 
Lazio  79.36 51.15 28.72 10.00  3 
Abruzzo and Molise  109.51  49.77  16.39  4.93  2 
Campania  94.95 59.89 27.30 11.49  3 
Puglia  81.86 43.11 22.38  5.78  2 
Basilicata  80.59 49.13 22.10  4.58  2 
Calabria  82.43 46.84 24.84  8.78  2 
Sicily  104.37 47.18 19.49  9.33  2 
Sardinia  81.94 42.59 19.15  7.00  1 
Centre and North  112.63  64.74  23.93  7.48  2 
South and Islands  94.18  46.63  16.37  7.61  2 
Italy  111.01 53.37 21.56  9.17  2 
  
Critical values
b       
10%  60.0 39.7 23.3 10.7   
5%  63.7 42.8 25.7 12.5   
1%  70.9 48.9 30.7 16.2   
  
Notes: the underlying VAR model contains both an intercept and a linear deterministic trend; the lag order is 
set to 3 for all areas.  
a The test decision is based on the asymptotic critical values reported in the bottom rows of the table.
 b The 
asymptotic critical values are taken from MacKinnon et al. (1999), Table V. The cointegration ranks reported 





LONG-TERM EFFECTS ON GDP OF REGIONAL PUBLIC CAPITAL  
(percentage values and units of euros) 











      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  0.62 (++)  1.86  0.13 
Lombardy 0.05  0.21  0.02 
Trentino-Alto Adige  0.69 (++)  1.04  0.03 
Veneto 0.95  (++)  2.67  0.18 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  0.25  0.36  0.01 
Liguria 0.52  0.90  0.04 
Emilia-Romagna 0.26  (+)  0.61  0.05 
Tuscany 0.80  (+)  1.60  0.12 
Umbria 0.54  0.84  0.02 
Marche 0.56  0.98  0.03 
Lazio 0.74  (+)  1.69  0.16 
Abruzzo and Molise  0.09  0.10  0.00 
Campania 0.51  0.86  0.08 
Puglia 0.60  (++)  1.17  0.06 
Basilicata 0.93  (++)  0.43  0.01 
Calabria 0.48  (++)  0.34  0.02 
Sicily 0.55  (++)  0.70  0.08 
Sardinia 0.16  0.15  0.01 
Centre and North  0.40 (++)  1.11   
South and Islands  0.61 (++)  0.84   
Italy 0.62  (++)  1.39  1.07 




Source: based on Istat data. 
Notes: (+) (++) denotes that the 68% (90%) confidence interval does not include zero. The confidence intervals 
for the individual regions are computed using the bootstrap procedure. They refer to the impulse response 
estimates. 
a The long-run elasticities give the long-run percentage change in private capital, employment and real GDP per 
1% long-run change in public capital. They are obtained by dividing the long-run response of private capital, 
employment and real GDP to a shock to public capital, respectively, by the long-run response of public capital 
to a shock to public capital. In the computations, we set the response horizon n=500 which ensures that for all 
countries the impulse responses have converged to their long-run levels (Kamps, 2005). 
b The regional marginal products in the table are obtained by multiplying the elasticities by the GDP / K
G ratio.  
c The contributions to the aggregate marginal products are computed by weighting these figures using the share 




LONG-TERM EFFECTS ON PRIVATE CAPITAL 
OF AN IMPULSE ON REGIONAL PUBLIC CAPITAL  
(percentage changes and units of euros) 












Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  0.62 (++)  7.5  0.46 
Lombardy 0.21  (++)  2.8  0.30 
Trentino-Alto Adige  0.82 (++)  6.6  0.19 
Veneto 0.24  (++)  2.9  0.18 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  0.27  1.8  0.06 
Liguria 0.32  1.7  0.06 
Emilia-Romagna 0.37  (+)  3.6  0.26 
Tuscany 0.78  (+)  5.7  0.37 
Umbria -0.01  -0.1  0.00 
Marche 0.62  (++)  4.9  0.13 
Lazio 0.51  4.1  0.36 
Abruzzo and Molise  0.45  2.7  0.11 
Campania 0.72  (+)  7.1  0.56 
Puglia 0.66  (++)  6.1  0.30 
Basilicata 0.82  (++)  2.9  0.09 
Calabria 0.36  (++)  1.6  0.10 
Sicily 0.67  (++)  4.8  0.47 
Sardinia 0.31  (+) 1.9  0.09 
Centre and North  0.48 (++)  4.8   
South and Islands  0.65 (++)  4.6   
Italy 0.54  (++)  4.7  4.09 





Source: based on Istat data. 
Notes: (+) (++) denotes that the 68% (90%) confidence interval does not include zero. The confidence 
intervals for the individual regions are computed using the bootstrap procedure. They refer to the impulse 
response estimates. 
a The long-run elasticities give the long-run percentage change in private capital, employment and real 
GDP per 1% long-run change in public capital. They are obtained by dividing the long-run response of 
private capital, employment and real GDP to a shock to public capital, respectively, by the long-run 
response of public capital to a shock to public capital. In the computations, we set the response horizon 
n=500 which ensures that for all countries the impulse responses have converged to their long-run levels 
(Kamps, 2005). 
b The regional marginal products in the table are obtained by multiplying the elasticities by the Kpriv / K
G 
ratio.  
c The contributions to the aggregate marginal products are computed by weighting these figures using the 




LONG-TERM EFFECTS ON LABOUR OF AN IMPULSE ON  
REGIONAL PUBLIC CAPITAL  
(percentage changes and units of euros) 










      
Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta  0.24  0.03  0.002 
Lombardy 0.38  (++) 0.05 0.006 
Trentino-Alto Adige  0.62 (++) 0.04 0.001 
Veneto 1.12  (++) 0.13 0.008 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  0.06  0.00  0.000 
Liguria 0.60  0.04  0.001 
Emilia-Romagna 0.36  (+) 0.04  0.003 
Tuscany 0.76  (+) 0.07  0.004 
Umbria 1.52  (++) 0.11 0.002 
Marche 0.27  (+) 0.02  0.001 
Lazio 0.79  (+) 0.07  0.006 
Abruzzo and Molise  -0.61 (+) -0.03  -0.001 
Campania 0.24  0.02  0.002 
Puglia 0.89  (++) 0.09 0.004 
Basilicata 0.91  (++) 0.02 0.001 
Calabria 0.52  (++) 0.02 0.001 
Sicily 0.50  (++) 0.03 0.003 
Sardinia 0.34  0.02  0.001 
Centre and North  1.09 (++) 0.10   
South and Islands  0.53 (++) 0.03   
Italy 0.79  (++) 0.06 0.053 
Total all regions as % of total 
Italy     83.5 
  
Source: based on Istat data. 
Notes: (+) (++) denotes that the 68% (90%) confidence interval does not include zero. The confidence 
intervals for the individual regions are computed using the bootstrap procedure. They refer to the impulse 
response estimates. 
a The long-run elasticities give the long-run percentage change in private capital, employment and real 
GDP per 1% long-run change in public capital. They are obtained by dividing the long-run response of 
private capital, employment and real GDP to a shock to public capital, respectively, by the long-run 
response of public capital to a shock to public capital. In the computations, we set the response horizon 
n=500 which ensures that for all countries the impulse responses have converged to their long-run levels 
(Kamps, 2005). 
b The regional marginal products in the table are obtained by multiplying the elasticities by the L / K
G ratio.  
c The contributions to the aggregate marginal products are computed by weighting these figures using the 




LONG-TERM EFFECTS ON MAIN AGGREGATES  
OF AN IMPULSE ON TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURES 
(percentage changes and units of euros) 










      
GDP      
Italy 0.70  (++)  4.2   
Centre and North   0.30 (+)  2.3  1.38 
South and Islands  0.48 (++)  1.8  0.74 
      
Private Capital      
Italy 0.54  (++)  15.0   
Centre and North   0.46 (++)  14.4  8.6 
South and Islands  0.55 (++)  12.3  5.0 
      
Labour      
Italy 0.56  (++)  0.13   
Centre and North   0.89 (++)  0.24  0.15 
South and Islands  0.43 (++)  0.07  0.03 
  
Source: based on Istat data. 
Notes: (+) (++) denotes that the 68% (90%) confidence interval does not include zero. The confidence 
intervals for the individual regions are computed using the bootstrap procedure. They refer to the impulse 
response estimates. 
a The long-run elasticities give the long-run percentage change in private capital, employment and real 
GDP per 1% long-run change in public capital. They are obtained by dividing the long-run response of 
private capital, employment and real GDP to a shock to public capital, respectively, by the long-run 
response of public capital to a shock to public capital. In the computations, we set the response horizon 
n=500 which ensures that for all countries the impulse responses have converged to their long-run levels 
(Kamps, 2005). 
b The regional marginal products in the table are obtained by multiplying the elasticities by the GDP (or 
Kpriv or L) / K
TRASP ratio.  
c The contributions to the aggregate marginal products are computed by weighting these figures with the 











PUBLIC CAPITAL GROWTH IN ITALY, BY TYPE OF WORKS 
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Source: based on Istat data. 
Figure 4 
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References 
Alessi, L., Barigozzi, M., and Capasso, M., (2008), “A review of nonfundamentalness and 
identification in structural VAR models”, BCE Working Paper Series, no. 922, July 2008. 
Aschauer, D., (1989a), “Is public expenditure productive?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 
23, 177-200. 
Aschauer, D., (1989b), “Does public capital crowd out private capital?”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, vol. 24, 171-188. 
Baghli, M., Cahn, C., and Villetelle, J.P., (2006), “Estimating Potential Output with a Production 
Function for France, Germany and Italy”, in Convergence or Divergence in Europe?, by 
Bandt, O., Herrmann, H., and Parigi, G., (eds), Springer. 
Baxter, M., and King, R.G., (1993), “Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium”, American Economic 
Review, vol. 83 (3), 315-333. 
Blanchard, O.J., and Quah, D., (1989), “The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply 
disturbances”, American Economic Review, vol. 79(4), 655-73. 
Bonaglia, F., La Ferrara, E., and Marcellino, M., (2000), “Public Capital and Economic 
Performance: Evidence from Italy”, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, no. 2, 
221-244. 
Bonaglia, F., and Picci, L., (2000), “Lo stock di capitale nelle regioni italiane”, Università di 
Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, Quaderni, no. 374. 
Bronzini, R., and Piselli, P., (2009), “Determinants of long-run regional productivity: the role of 
R&D, human capital and public infrastructure”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 
39(2), 187-199. 
Christiano, L.J., Eichenbaum, M. and Vigfusson, R., (2006), “Assessing structural VARs”, NBER 
Working Paper no. 12353, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
De Stefanis, S., and Sena V., (2005), “Public Capital and Total Factor Productivity: New Evidence 
from the Italian Regions, 1970–98”, Regional Studies, vol. 39(5), 603-617. 
Ecoter (2000), “La dotazione infrastrutturale nelle province italiane. Aggiornamento al 1997”, 
Confindustria, Area Mezzogiorno e Area Politiche Territoriali, No. 33. 
Golden, M., and Picci, L., (2005), “Proposal for a new measure of corruption, illustrated with 
italian data”, Eonomics & Politics, vol. 17(1). 
Hansen, L.P., and Sargent, T. J., (1980), “Formulating and estimating dynamic linear rational 
expectations models”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 2(2), 7-46. 
Holtz-Eakin, D., (1993), “State-specific Estimates of State and Local Government Capital”, 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 23, 185-209.  
Holtz-Eakin, D., and Schwartz, A.E., (1995), “Spatial Productivity Spillovers from Public 
Infrastructures: Evidence from State Highways”, International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 
2, 459-468.   
Johansen, S., (1988), “Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors”, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, vol. 12 (2-3), 231-254.  
 
43
Johansen, S., (1991), “Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian 
Vector Autoregressive Models”, Econometrica, vol. 59 (6), 1551-1580. 
Kamps, C., (2005), “The Dynamic Effects of Public Capital: VAR Evidence for 22 OECD 
Countries”, International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 12, 533-558. 
La Ferrara, E., and Marcellino, M., (2000), “TFP, costs, and public infrastructure: an equivocal 
relationship”, IGIER Working Paper no. 176.  
Lippi, M., and Reichlin, L., (1993), “The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply 
disturbances: Comment”, American Economic Review, vol. 83(3), 644-52. 
Lippi, M., and Reichlin, L., (1994), “VAR analysis, nonfundamental representations, Blaschke 
matrices”, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 63(1), 307-325. 
Lutkepohl, H., (2001), “Vector Autoregressions”, in B.H. Baltagi (ed.), A Companion to 
Theoretical Econometrics, Oxford, Blackwell. 
MacKinnon, J.G., Haug, A.A., and Michelis, L., (1999), “Numerical Distribution Functions of 
Likelihood Ratio Tests for Cointegration“, Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 5, 563-577. 
Mittnik, S., and Neumann, T., (2001), “Dynamic Effects of Public Investment: Vector 
Autoregressive Evidence from Six Industrialized Countries“, Empirical Economics, vol. 
26(2), 429-446. 
Montanaro, P., (2003), “Lo stock di capitale pubblico: una stima per regione e per tipologia di 
bene”, Rivista economica del Mezzogiorno, vol. 17(3). 
Munnell, A.H., (1990), “How Does Public Infrastructure Affect Regional Economic Performance?”, 
New England Economic Review, Sept.-Oct, 11–33. 
OECD (1992), “Methods used by OECD Countries to measure Stocks of Fixed Capital”, National 
Accounts: Sources and Methods, no. 2, Paris. 
OECD (2001), Measuring Capital. Measurement of Capital Stocks, Consumption of Fixed Capital 
and Capital Services, Paris. 
Pereira, A.M., (2000), “Is All Public Capital Created Equal?”, Review of Economics and Statistics 
vol. 82 (3), 513-518. 
Pereira, A.M., (2001), “Public Investment and Private Sector Performance – International 
Evidence”, Public Finance & Management, vol. 1(2), 261-277. 
Pereira, A.M., and Roca-Sagalés, O. (2003), “Spillover Effects of Public Capital Formation: 
Evidence from the Spanish Regions”, Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 53, 238-256. 
Phillips, P.C.B., (1998), “Impulse Response and Forecast Error Variance Asymptotics in 
Nonstationary VARs”, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 83 (1-2), 21-56. 
Picci, L., (1999), “Productivity and infrastructure in the Italian regions”, Giornale degli Economisti 
ed Annali di Economia, vol. 58, 329–353. 
Pina, Á.M., and St. Aubyn, M., (2006), “How should we measure the return on public investment in 
a VAR?”, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(5), 1-4. 
Piselli, P., (2001), “Lo stock di capitale nelle regioni italiane: una ricostruzione 1980-1996”, Bank 
of Italy, mimeo.  
 
44
Rosa, G., and Siesto, V., (1985), “Il capitale fisso industriale. Stime settoriali e verifiche dirette”, 
Quaderni de L’industria, vol. 22, Il Mulino, Bologna. 
Sims, C.A., (1980), “Macroeconomics and Reality”, Econometrica, no. 48, 1-48. 






N.		710	 –	 Gradualism, transparency and the improved operational framework: a look at the 
overnight volatility transmission,	by	Silvio	Colarossi	and	Andrea	Zaghini	(May	
2009).
N.		711	 –	 The topology of the interbank market: developments in Italy since 1990,	by	Carmela	
Iazzetta	and	Michele	Manna	(May	2009).
N.		712	 –  Bank risk and monetary policy,	by	Yener	Altunbas,	Leonardo	Gambacorta	and	
David	Marqués-Ibáñez	(May	2009).
N.	 713	 –	 Composite indicators for monetary analysis,	by	Andrea	Nobili	(May	2009).
N.	 714	 –	 L'attività  retail  delle  banche  estere  in  Italia:  effetti  sull'offerta  di  credito  alle 
famiglie e alle imprese, by	Luigi	Infante	and	Paola	Rossi	(June	2009)
N.	 715	 –	 Firm heterogeneity and comparative advantage: the response of French firms to 
Turkey's entry in the European Customs Union,	by	Ines	Buono	(June	2009).
N.	 716	 –	 The euro and firm restructuring,	by	Matteo	Bugamelli,	Fabiano	Schivardi	and	
Roberta	Zizza	(June	2009).
N.	 717	 –	 When  the  highest  bidder  loses  the  auction:  theory  and  evidence  from  public 
procurement,	by	Francesco	Decarolis	(June	2009).
N.	 718	 –	 Innovation and productivity in SMEs. Empirical evidence for Italy,	by	Bronwyn	H.	
Hall,	Francesca	Lotti	and	Jacques	Mairesse	(June	2009).
N.	 719	 –	 Household wealth and entrepreneurship: is there a link?,	by	Silvia	Magri	(June	
2009).
N.	 720	 –	 The  announcement  of  monetary  policy  intentions,	 by	 Giuseppe	 Ferrero	 and	
Alessandro	Secchi	(September	2009).
N.	 721	 –	 Trust and regulation: addressing a cultural bias,	by	Paolo	Pinotti	(September	
2009).
N.	 722	 –	 The effects of privatization and consolidation on bank productivity: comparative 
evidence from Italy and Germany,	by	E.	Fiorentino,	A.	De	Vincenzo,	F.	Heid,	A.	
Karmann	and	M.	Koetter	(September	2009).
N.	 723	 –	 Comparing forecast accuracy: a Monte Carlo investigation,	by	Fabio	Busetti,	Juri	
Marcucci	and	Giovanni	Veronese	(September	2009).
N.	 724	 –	 Nonlinear dynamics in welfare and the evolution of world inequality,	by	Davide	
Fiaschi	and	Marzia	Romanelli		(October	2009).
N.	 725	 –	 How are firms’ wages and prices linked: survey evidence in Europe ,	by	Martine	
Druant,	Silvia	Fabiani,	Gabor	Kezdi,	Ana	Lamo,	Fernando	Martins	and	Roberto	
Sabbatini	(October	2009).
N.	 726	 –	 Low skilled immigration and the expansion of private schools,	by	Davide	Dottori	
and	I-Ling	Shen		(October	2009).
N.	 727	 –	 Sorting, reputation and entry in a market for experts,	by	Enrico	Sette	(October	
2009).
N.	 728	 –	 Ricardian selection,	by	Andrea	Finicelli,	Patrizio	Pagano	and	Massimo	Sbracia	
(October	2009).
N.	 729	 –	 Trade-revealed TFP,	by	Andrea	Finicelli,	Patrizio	Pagano	and	Massimo	Sbracia	
(October	2009).
N.	 730	 –	 The riskiness of corporate bonds,	by	Marco	Taboga	(October	2009).
N.	 731	 –	 The interbank market after august 2007: what has changed and why?,	by	Paolo	








F. BUSETTI,  Tests of seasonal integration and cointegration in multivariate unobserved component 
models, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 21, 4, pp. 419-438, TD No. 476 (June 2003). 
C. BIANCOTTI, A polarization of inequality? The distribution of national Gini coefficients 1970-1996, 
Journal of Economic Inequality, Vol. 4, 1, pp. 1-32, TD No. 487 (March 2004). 
L. CANNARI and S. CHIRI, La bilancia dei pagamenti di parte corrente Nord-Sud (1998-2000), in L. 
Cannari, F. Panetta (a cura di), Il sistema finanziario e il Mezzogiorno: squilibri strutturali e divari 
finanziari, Bari, Cacucci, TD No. 490 (March 2004). 
M. BOFONDI and G. GOBBI, Information barriers to entry into credit markets, Review of Finance, Vol. 10, 
1, pp. 39-67,  TD No. 509 (July 2004). 
W. FUCHS and LIPPI F., Monetary union with voluntary participation, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 
73, pp. 437-457 TD No. 512  (July 2004). 
E. GAIOTTI and A. SECCHI, Is there a cost channel of monetary transmission? An investigation into the 
pricing behaviour of 2000 firms, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 38, 8, pp. 2013-2038 
TD No. 525 (December 2004). 
A. BRANDOLINI, P. CIPOLLONE and E. VIVIANO, Does the ILO definition capture all unemployment?, Journal 
of the European Economic Association, Vol. 4, 1, pp. 153-179, TD No. 529 (December 2004). 
A. BRANDOLINI, L. CANNARI, G. D’ALESSIO and I. FAIELLA, Household wealth distribution in Italy in the 
1990s, in E. N. Wolff (ed.) International Perspectives on Household Wealth, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, TD No. 530 (December 2004). 
P. DEL G IOVANE and R. SABBATINI, Perceived and measured inflation after the launch of the Euro: 
Explaining the gap in Italy, Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia, Vol. 65, 2 , pp. 155-
192, TD No. 532 (December 2004). 
M. CARUSO,  Monetary policy impulses, local output and the transmission mechanism, Giornale degli 
economisti e annali di economia, Vol. 65, 1, pp. 1-30, TD No. 537 (December 2004). 
L. GUISO and M. PAIELLA, The role of risk aversion in predicting individual behavior, In P. A. Chiappori e 
C. Gollier (eds.) Competitive Failures in Insurance Markets: Theory and Policy Implications, 
Monaco, CESifo, TD No. 546 (February 2005). 
G. M. TOMAT, Prices product differentiation and quality measurement: A comparison between hedonic 
and matched model methods, Research in Economics, Vol. 60, 1, pp. 54-68, TD No. 547 
(February 2005). 
L. GUISO, M. PAIELLA and I. VISCO, Do capital gains affect consumption? Estimates of wealth effects from 
Italian household's behavior, in L. Klein (ed), Long Run Growth and Short Run Stabilization: 
Essays in Memory of Albert Ando (1929-2002), Cheltenham, Elgar, TD No. 555 (June 2005). 
F. BUSETTI, S. FABIANI and A. HARVEY, Convergence of prices and rates of inflation, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 68, 1, pp. 863-878, TD No. 575 (February 2006). 
M. CARUSO, Stock market fluctuations and money demand in Italy, 1913 - 2003, Economic Notes, Vol. 35, 
1, pp. 1-47, TD No. 576 (February 2006). 
R. BRONZINI and G. DE BLASIO, Evaluating the impact of investment incentives: The case of Italy’s Law 
488/92. Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 60, 2, pp. 327-349, TD No. 582 (March 2006). 
R. BRONZINI and G. DE BLASIO, Una valutazione degli incentivi pubblici agli investimenti, Rivista Italiana 
degli Economisti , Vol. 11, 3, pp. 331-362, TD No. 582 (March 2006). 
A. DI CESARE, Do market-based indicators anticipate rating agencies? Evidence for international banks,  
Economic Notes, Vol. 35, pp. 121-150,  TD No. 593 (May 2006). 
R. GOLINELLI and S.  MOMIGLIANO, Real-time determinants of fiscal policies in the euro area, Journal of 





S. SIVIERO and D. TERLIZZESE, Macroeconomic forecasting: Debunking a few old wives’ tales, Journal of 
Business Cycle Measurement and Analysis , v. 3, 3, pp. 287-316, TD No. 395 (February 2001). 
S.  MAGRI,  Italian households' debt: The participation to the debt market and the size of the loan, 
Empirical Economics, v. 33, 3, pp. 401-426, TD No. 454 (October 2002). 
L. CASOLARO. and G. GOBBI, Information technology and productivity changes in the banking industry, 
Economic Notes, Vol. 36, 1, pp. 43-76, TD No. 489 (March 2004). 
G. FERRERO, Monetary policy, learning and the speed of convergence, Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, v. 31, 9, pp. 3006-3041, TD No. 499 (June 2004). 
M. PAIELLA, Does wealth affect consumption? Evidence for Italy, Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 29, 1,  
pp. 189-205, TD No. 510 (July 2004). 
F. LIPPI. and S. NERI, Information variables for monetary policy in a small structural model of the euro 
area, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, 4, pp. 1256-1270, TD No. 511 (July 2004). 
A. ANZUINI and A. LEVY, Monetary policy shocks in the new EU members: A VAR approach, Applied 
Economics, Vol. 39, 9, pp. 1147-1161,  TD No. 514 (July 2004). 
D. JR. MARCHETTI and F. Nucci, Pricing behavior and the response of hours to productivity shocks, 
Journal of Money Credit and Banking, v. 39, 7, pp. 1587-1611, TD No. 524 (December 2004). 
R. BRONZINI, FDI Inflows, agglomeration and host country firms' size: Evidence from Italy, Regional 
Studies, Vol. 41, 7, pp. 963-978, TD No. 526 (December 2004). 
L. MONTEFORTE,  Aggregation bias in macro models: Does it matter for the euro area?, Economic 
Modelling, 24, pp. 236-261, TD No. 534 (December 2004). 
A.  NOBILI,  Assessing the predictive power of financial spreads in the euro area: does parameters 
instability matter?, Empirical Economics, Vol. 31, 1, pp. 177-195, TD No. 544 (February 2005). 
A. DALMAZZO and G. DE BLASIO, Production and consumption externalities of human capital: An empirical 
study for Italy, Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 20, 2, pp. 359-382, TD No. 554 (June 2005). 
M. BUGAMELLI and R. TEDESCHI,  Le strategie di prezzo delle imprese esportatrici italiane, Politica 
Economica, v. 23, 3, pp. 321-350, TD No. 563 (November 2005). 
L.  GAMBACORTA  and  S.  IANNOTTI,  Are there asymmetries in the response of bank interest rates to 
monetary shocks?, Applied Economics, v. 39, 19, pp. 2503-2517,  TD No. 566 (November 2005). 
P. ANGELINI  and  F.  LIPPI,  Did prices really soar after the euro cash changeover? Evidence from ATM 
withdrawals, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 3, 4, pp. 1-22, TD No. 581 (March 2006). 
A. LOCARNO, Imperfect knowledge, adaptive learning and the bias against activist monetary policies, 
International Journal of Central Banking, v. 3, 3, pp. 47-85, TD No. 590 (May 2006). 
F.  LOTTI and J.  MARCUCCI,  Revisiting the empirical evidence on firms' money demand, Journal of 
Economics and Business, Vol. 59, 1, pp. 51-73, TD No. 595 (May 2006). 
P. CIPOLLONE and A. ROSOLIA, Social interactions in high school: Lessons from an earthquake, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 97, 3, pp. 948-965, TD No. 596 (September 2006). 
L. DEDOLA and S. NERI, What does a technology shock do? A VAR analysis with model-based sign restrictions,  
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, 2, pp. 512-549, TD No. 607 (December 2006). 
F. VERGARA CAFFARELLI, Merge and compete: strategic incentives for vertical integration, Rivista di 
politica economica, v. 97, 9-10, serie 3, pp. 203-243, TD No. 608 (December 2006). 
A. BRANDOLINI, Measurement of income distribution in supranational entities: The case of the European 
Union, in S. P. Jenkins e J. Micklewright (eds.), Inequality and Poverty Re-examined, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, TD No. 623 (April 2007). 
M. PAIELLA, The foregone gains of incomplete portfolios, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 20, 5, pp. 
1623-1646, TD No. 625 (April 2007). 
K.  BEHRENS,  A.  R.  LAMORGESE,  G.I.P.  OTTAVIANO  and  T.  TABUCHI,  Changes in transport and non 
transport costs: local vs. global impacts in a spatial network, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, Vol. 37, 6, pp. 625-648, TD No. 628 (April 2007). 
M. BUGAMELLI, Prezzi delle esportazioni, qualità dei prodotti e caratteristiche di impresa: analisi su un 
campione di imprese italiane, v. 34, 3, pp. 71-103, Economia e Politica Industriale, TD No. 634 
(June 2007). 
G. ASCARI and T. ROPELE,  Optimal monetary policy under low trend inflation, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, v. 54, 8, pp. 2568-2583, TD No. 647 (November 2007). 
 R. GIORDANO, S. MOMIGLIANO, S. NERI and R. PEROTTI, The Effects of Fiscal Policy in Italy: Evidence 
from a VAR Model, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 23, 3, pp. 707-733, TD No. 656 
(January 2008). 
B. ROFFIA and A. ZAGHINI, Excess money growth and inflation dynamics, International Finance, v. 10, 3, 
pp. 241-280, TD No. 657 (January 2008). 
G. BARBIERI, P. CIPOLLONE and P. SESTITO, Labour market for teachers: demographic characteristics and 
allocative mechanisms, Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia, v. 66, 3, pp. 335-373, TD 
No. 672 (June 2008). 
E. BREDA, R. CAPPARIELLO and R. ZIZZA, Vertical specialisation in Europe: evidence from the import 







P. ANGELINI, Liquidity and announcement effects in the euro area, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di 
Economia, v. 67, 1, pp. 1-20, TD No. 451 (October 2002). 
P. ANGELINI, P. DEL GIOVANE, S. SIVIERO and  D. TERLIZZESE, Monetary policy in a monetary union: What 
role for regional information?, International Journal of Central Banking, v. 4, 3, pp. 1-28, TD No. 
457 (December 2002). 
F.  SCHIVARDI  and R. TORRINI,  Identifying the effects of firing restrictions through size-contingent 
Differences in regulation, Labour Economics, v. 15, 3, pp. 482-511,  TD No. 504 (June 2004). 
L. GUISO and M. PAIELLA,, Risk aversion, wealth and background risk, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, v. 6, 6, pp. 1109-1150, TD No. 483 (September 2003). 
C. BIANCOTTI, G. D'ALESSIO and A. NERI, Measurement errors in the Bank of Italy’s survey of household 
income and wealth, Review of Income and Wealth, v. 54, 3, pp. 466-493, TD No. 520 (October 
2004). 
S. MOMIGLIANO, J. HENRY and P. HERNÁNDEZ  DE COS, The impact of government budget on prices: 
Evidence from macroeconometric models, Journal of Policy Modelling, v. 30, 1, pp. 123-143 TD No. 
523 (October 2004). 
L. GAMBACORTA, How do banks set interest rates?, European Economic Review, v. 52, 5, pp. 792-819,  
TD No. 542 (February 2005). 
P. ANGELINI and A. GENERALE, On the evolution of firm size distributions, American Economic Review, 
v. 98, 1, pp. 426-438, TD No. 549 (June 2005). 
R. FELICI and M. PAGNINI, Distance, bank heterogeneity and entry in local banking markets, The Journal 
of Industrial Economics, v. 56, 3, pp. 500-534,  No. 557 (June 2005). 
S. DI ADDARIO and E. PATACCHINI, Wages and the city. Evidence from Italy, Labour Economics, v.15, 5, 
pp. 1040-1061, TD No. 570 (January 2006). 
M. PERICOLI and M. TABOGA, Canonical term-structure models with observable factors and the dynamics 
of bond risk premia, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, v. 40, 7, pp. 1471-88, TD No. 580 
(February 2006). 
E. VIVIANO, Entry regulations and labour market outcomes. Evidence from the Italian retail trade sector, 
Labour Economics, v. 15, 6, pp. 1200-1222, TD No. 594 (May 2006). 
S. FEDERICO and G. A. MINERVA, Outward FDI and local employment growth in Italy, Review of World 
Economics, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, v. 144, 2, pp. 295-324, TD No. 613 (February 
2007). 
F. BUSETTI and A. HARVEY, Testing for trend, Econometric Theory, v. 24, 1, pp. 72-87, TD No. 614 
(February 2007). 
V. CESTARI, P. DEL GIOVANE and C. ROSSI-ARNAUD, Memory for prices and the Euro cash changeover: an 
analysis for cinema prices in Italy, In P. Del Giovane e R. Sabbatini (eds.), The Euro Inflation and 
Consumers’ Perceptions. Lessons from Italy, Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer, TD No. 619 (February 2007). 
B. H. HALL, F. LOTTI and J. MAIRESSE, Employment, innovation and productivity: evidence from Italian 
manufacturing microdata, Industrial and Corporate Change, v. 17, 4, pp. 813-839, TD No. 622 (April 
2007). J. SOUSA  and  A.  ZAGHINI,  Monetary policy shocks in the Euro Area and global liquidity spillovers, 
International Journal of Finance and Economics, v.13, 3, pp. 205-218, TD No. 629 (June 2007). 
M. DEL GATTO, GIANMARCO I. P. OTTAVIANO and M. PAGNINI, Openness to trade and  industry cost 
dispersion: Evidence from a panel of Italian firms, Journal of Regional Science, v. 48, 1, pp. 97-
129, TD No. 635 (June 2007). 
P. DEL GIOVANE, S. FABIANI and R. SABBATINI, What’s behind “inflation perceptions”? A survey-based 
analysis of Italian consumers, in P. Del Giovane e R. Sabbatini (eds.), The Euro Inflation and 
Consumers’ Perceptions. Lessons from Italy, Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer, TD No. 655 (January 
2008). 
B. BORTOLOTTI, and P. PINOTTI, Delayed privatization, Public Choice, v. 136, 3-4, pp. 331-351, TD No. 
663 (April 2008). 
R. BONCI and F. COLUMBA, Monetary policy effects: New evidence from the Italian flow of funds, Applied 
Economics , v. 40, 21, pp. 2803-2818, TD No. 678 (June 2008). 
M. CUCCULELLI, and G. MICUCCI, Family Succession and firm performance: evidence from Italian family 
firms, Journal of Corporate Finance, v. 14, 1, pp. 17-31, TD No. 680 (June 2008). 
A. SILVESTRINI and D. VEREDAS, Temporal aggregation of univariate and multivariate time series models: 





F.  PANETTA,  F. SCHIVARDI and M. SHUM, Do mergers improve information? Evidence from the loan 
market, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, v. 41, 4, pp. 673-709, TD No. 521 (October 
2004). 
P. PAGANO and M. PISANI, Risk-adjusted forecasts of oil prices, The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, v. 
9, 1, Article 24, TD No. 585 (March 2006). 
M. PERICOLI and M. SBRACIA,  The CAPM and the risk appetite index: theoretical differences, empirical 
similarities, and implementation problems, International Finance, v. 12, 2, pp. 123-150, TD No. 
586 (March 2006). 
S. MAGRI, The financing of small innovative firms: the Italian case,  Economics of Innovation and New 
Technology, v. 18, 2, pp. 181-204,  TD No. 640 (September 2007). 
S. MAGRI, The financing of small entrepreneurs in Italy,  Annals of Finance, v. 5, 3-4, pp. 397-419,  TD 
No. 640 (September 2007). 
F. LORENZO, L. MONTEFORTE and L. SESSA, The general equilibrium effects of fiscal policy: estimates for the 
euro area, Journal of Public Economics, v. 93, 3-4, pp. 559-585, TD No. 652 (November 2007). 
R. GOLINELLI and S. MOMIGLIANO, The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area. A Critical 
Survey of Empirical Research, Fiscal Studies, v. 30, 1, pp. 39-72, TD No. 654 (January 2008). 
P. DEL GIOVANE, S. FABIANI and R. SABBATINI, What’s behind “Inflation Perceptions”? A survey-based 
analysis of Italian consumers, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, v. 68, 1, pp. 25-
52, TD No. 655 (January 2008). 
F. MACCHERONI, M. MARINACCI, A. RUSTICHINI and M. TABOGA, Portfolio selection with monotone mean-
variance preferences, Mathematical Finance, v. 19, 3, pp. 487-521, TD No. 664 (April 2008). 
M. AFFINITO and M. PIAZZA, What are borders made of? An analysis of barriers to European banking 
integration, in P. Alessandrini, M. Fratianni and A. Zazzaro (eds.): The Changing Geography of 
Banking and Finance, Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York, Springer, TD No. 666 (April 2008). 
L. ARCIERO, C. BIANCOTTI, L. D'AURIZIO and C. IMPENNA, Exploring agent-based methods for the analysis 
of payment systems: A crisis model for StarLogo TNG, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation, v. 12, 1, TD No. 686 (August 2008). 
A. CALZA  and  A.  ZAGHINI,  Nonlinearities in the dynamics of the euro area demand for M1, 
Macroeconomic Dynamics, v. 13, 1, pp. 1-19, TD No. 690 (September 2008). 
L. FRANCESCO and A. SECCHI, Technological change and the households’ demand for currency, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, v. 56, 2, pp. 222-230, TD No. 697 (December 2008). 
M. BUGAMELLI, F. SCHIVARDI and R. ZIZZA, The euro and firm restructuring, in A. Alesina e F. Giavazzi 
(eds): Europe and the Euro, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, TD No. 716 (June 2009). 
B. HALL, F. LOTTI and J. MAIRESSE, Innovation and productivity in SMEs: empirical evidence for Italy, 
Small Business Economics, v. 33, 1, pp. 13-33, TD No. 718 (June 2009).  
FORTHCOMING 
 
L. MONTEFORTE and S. SIVIERO, The Economic Consequences of Euro Area Modelling Shortcuts, Applied 
Economics, TD No. 458 (December 2002). 
M. BUGAMELLI and A. ROSOLIA,  Produttività e concorrenza estera, Rivista di politica economica, TD 
No. 578 (February 2006). 
G. DE BLASIO and G. NUZZO, Historical traditions of civicness and local economic development, Journal 
of Regional Science,  TD No. 591 (May 2006). 
R. BRONZINI and P. PISELLI, Determinants of long-run regional productivity with geographical spillovers: 
the role of R&D, human capital and public infrastructure, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics,  TD No. 597 (September 2006). 
E. IOSSA and G. PALUMBO, Over-optimism and lender liability in the consumer credit market, Oxford 
Economic Papers,  TD No. 598 (September 2006). 
U.  ALBERTAZZI  and L.  GAMBACORTA,  Bank profitability and the business cycle, Journal of Financial 
Stability,  TD No. 601 (September 2006). 
A. CIARLONE, P. PISELLI and G. TREBESCHI, Emerging Markets' Spreads and Global Financial Conditions, 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money, TD No. 637 (June 2007). 
V. DI GIACINTO and G. MICUCCI, The producer service sector in Italy: long-term growth and its local 
determinants, Spatial Economic Analysis,  TD No. 643 (September 2007). 
Y. ALTUNBAS, L. GAMBACORTA and D. MARQUÉS, Securitisation and the bank lending channel, European 
Economic Review, TD No. 653 (November 2007). 
F. BALASSONE, F. MAURA and S. ZOTTERI, Cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables in the EU, Empirica, TD 
No. 671 (June 2008). 
M. BUGAMELLI and F. PATERNÒ, Output growth volatility and remittances, Economica, TD No. 673 (June 
2008). 
M.  IACOVIELLO  and S.  NERI,  Housing market spillovers: evidence from an estimated DSGE model, 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,  TD No. 659 (January 2008). 
A. ACCETTURO, Agglomeration and growth: the effects of commuting costs, Papers in Regional Science, 
TD No. 688 (September 2008). 
L. FORNI, A. GERALI and M. PISANI, Macroeconomic effects of greater competition in the service sector: 
the case of Italy, Macroeconomic Dynamics, TD No. 706 (March 2009). 
Y. ALTUNBAS, L. GAMBACORTA, and D. MARQUÉS-IBÁÑEZ, Bank risk and monetary policy, Journal of 
Financial Stability, TD No. 712 (May 2009). 
 